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Armin von Bogdandy 
Founding Principles of EU Law 
A heoretical and Doctrinal Sketch
he article provides the groundwork for the constitutional law approach to EU legal 
scholarship. It stresses the special role of the basic principles of the EU legal order, ex-
plaining their dimensions, foundations and their functions. First of all, legal principles 
play a special role in ordering the legal material into a meaningful whole, a function the 
author entitles doctrinal constructivism. Furthermore, they can supply arguments for 
the creative application of the law and can at the same time help to maintain and further 
legal infrastructure. he author also explains their legal and integrative aspects and their 
constitutional characteristics and illustrates their signiicance for establishing unity of 
EU law in light of heterogeneous primary law. he article has previously been published 
in German (Europarecht 2009/6, 749-768) and English (European Law Journal 16 (2010), 
95-111). he author would like to thank Maja Smrkolj and Christian Wohlfahrt for their 
support in inalizing the article; and Jürgen Bast, Jochen von Bernstorf, Iris Canor, Pedro 
Cruz Villalón, Philipp Dann, and Michelle Everson for their valuable comments.
Keywords: European Union, constitutional law, basic principles, constitutional 
theory, functions of legal scholarship
1 INTRODUCTION
he study of principles is a well established way of legal scholarship striving for 
autonomy and searching for a disciplinary proprium behind the multifariousness 
of norms and judgments.1 Hence, there is no dearth of exquisite commentaries, 
monographs and handbooks on principles of EU law.2 his article seeks to further 
1 Seminal Immanuel Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunt, Riga, Hartknoch, 2nd edn, 1787, Edition 
B, 355 et seq, esp 358.
2 See, within the extensive literature, the still prominent perspective of common or general 
principles: Ulf Bernitz and Joakim Nergelius (eds), General Principles of European Commu-
nity Law, Den Haag, London and Boston, Kluwer Law International, 2000; Xavier Grous-
sot, General Principles of Community Law, Groningen, Europa Law Publishing, 2006; Takis 
Tridimas, he General Principles of EU Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006; Ricardo 
Gosalbo Bono, ‘he Development of General Principles of Law at National and Community 
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the understanding of the European legal discourse on such principles, illuminat-
ing its dimensions, foundations and functions (see section 2). Further, it analyses 
the difuse use of the term ‘principle’ in EU law. With reference to a political act, 
the codiication of Article 6(1) EU by the Amsterdam Treaty, it then deines as 
founding principles those norms of primary law which, in view of the need to le-
gitimise the exercise of any public authority, determine the general legitimatory 
foundations of the EU (see section 3). Finally, the viability of a comprehensive 
doctrine of principles for EU law and Community law is debated (see section 4).
2 THEORETICAL ISSUES REGARDING THE EU’S 
FOUNDING PRINCIPLES
2.1 A Founding Principles and Constitutional Scholarship
his article understands European primary law as constitutional law. Applying 
the category of constitutional law to European primary law certainly needs to be 
justiied, not least because of the failure of the Treaty establishing a Constitution 
for Europe. As a scholarly concept, however, it does not require the blessing of 
politics, and the European Council cannot authoritatively decide whether the 
Treaties on which the EU rests are of a ‘constitutional character’.3 In addition, 
what the European Council makes out to be a ‘constitutional concept’ is hard-
ly relevant from the perspective of legal research. According to the Council’s 
conclusions the constitutional concept of the constitutional Treaty ‘consisted 
in repealing all existing Treaties and replacing them by a single text called 
Level’, in Rainer Schulze and Ulrike Seif (eds), Richterrecht und Rechtsfortbildung in der Eu-
ropäischen Rechtsgemeinschat, Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, 2003, 99–142; from the perspective 
of constitutional principles, see Bengt Beutler, in Hans von der Groeben and Jürgen Schwarze 
(eds), Kommentar zum EU-/EG-Vertrag, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2003, Art 6 EU; Christian 
Calliess, in Christian Callies and Matthias Rufert (eds), EUV/EGV, München, Beck, 2007, 
Art 6 EU; Meinhard Hilf and Frank Schorkopf, Art 6 EU as well as Ingolf Pernice and Franz 
Mayer, Nach Art 6 EU, both in Christoph Grabitz and Meinhard Hilf (eds), Das Recht der 
EU, München, Beck, looseleaf, last update May 2008; Stelio Mangiameli (ed), L’ordinamento 
Europeo: I principi dell’Unione, Milano, Giufrè, 2006; Joël Molinier (ed), Les principes fonda-
teurs de l’Union européenne, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 2005; Hartmut Bauer and 
Christian Calliess (eds), SIPE 4: Constitutional Principles in Europe, Athens, Sakkoulas, 2008.
3 ‘he TEU and the Treaty on the Functioning of the Union will not have a constitutional 
character’, European Council, 21/22 June 2007, Presidency Conclusions (11177/1/07 REV 1), 
Annex I: IGC Mandate, para 3, available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_
Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/94932.pdf (accessed 29 January 2009). On the diferences be-
tween the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe of 2004 and the Lisbon Treaty, see 
Grainne de Burca, ‘General Report’, in Heribert Franz Köck et al (eds), Preparing the European 
Union for the Future, FIDE XXIII Congress Linz 2008, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2008, 385–406, 
391 et seq.
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“Constitution”’.4 In this view, neither Germany (Basic Law or Grundgesetz) nor 
Austria would have a constitution.5 Furthermore, no relevant actor challenges 
the jurisprudence of the ECJ6 that conceived the EC Treaty as a ‘constitutional 
charter’.7 
Approaches in legal scholarship like the constitutional law approach must 
be assessed on the basis of scholarly arguments. Certainly, the constitutional 
law approach demands supportive elements in its object of investigation. hese 
are not in short supply. he primary law justiies the exercise of public power, it 
legitimises acts of the EU, it creates a citizenship, it grants fundamental rights, 
and it regulates the relationship between legal orders, between public power and 
the economy, and between law and politics. Numerous common elements of 
EU primary law and national constitutions emerge in a functional comparison. 
Yet, not only the functions but also the ‘semantics’ support a constitutional law 
approach: the Treaty of Amsterdam provided in Article 6(1) EU (now Article 2 
EU-Lisbon) the key concepts of constitutional discourse: freedom, democracy, 
rule of law, protection of fundamental rights. Correspondingly, the constitu-
tional semantics of the ECJ have just taken a big step with the terms ‘constitu-
tional principle’ and ‘constitutional guarantee’.8
he constitutional interpretation is an academic postulate which is to be 
judged by its analytical, constructive, and normative merits. hus the task of 
a doctrine of European founding principles is also to prove the usefulness of 
the constitutionalist approach. he thesis is that primary law’s constitutional 
character9 manifests itself especially clearly in the founding principles. heir 
academic development as constitutional principles generates insight since this 
perspective leads to the relevant questions, knowledge and discourses. he con-
ception of primary law as constitutional law deines it as the framework for 
political struggle, thematises foundations, aims at self-assurance, mediates be-
tween societal and legal discourses.10
4 Ibid, para 1; according to the German government this would include the symbols and the 
denomination ‘European law’, Denkschrit der Bundesregierung zum Vertrag von Lissabon vom 
13 Dezember 2007 [Memoir of the Federal Government concerning the Treaty of Lisbon of 
13 December 2007], cited ater Bundesrat Drucksache 928/07, 133, 134. 
5 On the more than 100 Austrian federal constitutional laws, see Ewald Wiederin, ‘Grundlagen 
und Grundzüge staatlichen Verfassungsrechts: Österreich’, in Armin von Bogdandy et al (eds), 
Handbuch Ius Publicum Europaeum, Heidelberg, C. F. Müller, 2007), vol I, § 7, paras 44 et seq. 
6 ECJ, Case 294/83, Les Verts/Parlament, Slg. 1986, ECR 1339, para 23; Opinion 1/91, Agree-
ment relating to the creation of the European Economic Area I [1991] ECR I-6079, para 21.
7 For a similar view, see Michael Dougan, ‘he Treaty of Lisbon 2007’, (2008) 45 Common Mar-
ket Law Review 617–703, 698. 
8 ECJ, Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Kadi v Council [2008] ECR I-0000, paras 285, 290.
9 Opinion 1/91, op cit n 6 supra, para 21.
10 Philipp Dann, ‘Überlegungen zu einer Methodik des europäischen Verfassungsrechts’, in 
Y. Becker et al (eds), Die Europäische Verfassung – Verfassungen in Europa, Baden-Baden, 
Nomos, 2005, 161–186 at 167.
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At the same time, this approach pursues a strategic academic objective. he 
development of European constitutional law into a sub-discipline demands a 
speciic focus,11 just as the development of European law12 and then European 
Community law13 into sub-disciplines did previously. he treatment of primary 
law as constitutional law should bring about a new quality of understanding 
and exposition and promote the overcoming of understandings like ‘law of inte-
gration’ or ‘single market law’.14 A doctrine of principles not only observes, it is 
also part of the process of constitutionalisation. his leads to the next point.
2.2 hree Functions of a Legal Doctrine of Principles
Legal doctrines of principles are, in general, part of discourses internal to 
law, ie operations of the legal system. Such scholarship difers from approaches 
analysing the legal material from a social science perspective which for instance 
trace the factual constraints or motives afecting the law. A principles-oriented 
scholarship does not claim to prove causalities.15 It does not deal with empiri-
cal causes, but with argumentative reasons; causes and reasons relate to diferent 
cognitive interests and structures of argumentation. 
Rather, there are correlations with legal philosophy which nowadays oten 
argues based on principles.16 he relationship between the principles discourse 
in legal philosophy and in legal doctrine is as blurred as it is complicated. he 
diference cannot lie in the principles as such: they always include democracy, 
the rule of law, fundamental rights, etc. One diference is that a philosophical 
discourse on principles can proceed deductively, whereas a legal discourse on 
principles has to be linked to the positive legal material made up of legal provi-
sions and judicial decisions; it is hermeneutical and refers to the law in force. 
A procedural diference lies in the fact that a juridical conception of principles 
11 A separate journal has existed since 2005, the European Constitutional Law Review. Compare 
further the approach in international law: Stephan Kadelbach and homas Kleinlein, ‘Inter-
national Law a Constitution for Mankind? An Attempt at a Re-appraisal with the Analysis of 
Constitutional Principles’, (2007) 50 German Yearbook of International Law 303–347.
12 Hermann Mosler, ‘Der Vertrag über die Europäische Gemeinschat für Kohle und Stahl’, (1951–
1952) 14 Zeitschrit für ausländisches öfentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 1–45 at 23 et seq.
13 Hans-Peter Ipsen, Europäisches Gemeinschatsrecht (Mohr, 1972), 4 et seq.
14 Francis G. Snyder, ‘General Course on Constitutional Law of the European Union’, in Acade-
my of European Law (ed), Collected Courses of the Academy of European Law, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1998, vol VI, 41–155 at 47 et seq; Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, Constitutional 
Law of the European Union, Harlow, Longman, 2002.
15 Broader the sociological term whereby principles encompass empiric, causal and normative 
axioms, Stephen D. Krasner, ‘Structural Causes and Regime Consequences’, (1982) 36 Inter-
national Organization 185–205, at 186.
16 Framing the discourse, see J, Rawls, A heory of Justice, Oxford, Clarendon Press, revised 
edn 1999, irst edn 1972, 52; Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, London, Durckworth, 
1977, 22 et seq; J. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, Cambridge, Polity Press, reprint 2008, 
132, 168 et seq and 197.
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must eventually assert itself in judicial proceedings. Moreover: important as it is 
that the principles constructed by legal scholarship relect their possible philo-
sophical bases, it is as essential that, in pluralistic societies, the legal principles 
keep their distance to philosophical and ideological discourses in order to re-
main potential projection screens for similar, but factually divergent constructs. 
Philosophical considerations are inappropriate in court judgments.
2.2.1 Doctrinal Constructivism and its Limits
he irst doctrinal thrust of constitutional scholarship aims at identifying 
the principles inherent in the positive legal material, thus to organise the lat-
ter and to further the coherence of the constitutional material on this basis.17 
Coherence is ‘weaker than the analytic truth secured by logical deduction but 
stronger than mere freedom from contradiction’.18 he criterion of coherence 
demands a modeling which is sometimes described, with somewhat essential-
istic enthusiasm, as a ‘grand structural plan’.19 he ECJ makes use of this ap-
proach in important decisions when it refers to the ‘spirit’20 or the ‘nature’21 of 
the Treaties. he Supreme Court of Canada has formulated this understanding 
in an exemplary fashion:
he constitution is more than a written text. It embraces the entire global 
system of rules and principles which govern the exercise of constitutional au-
thority. A supericial reading of selected provisions of the written constitutional 
enactment, without more, may be misleading. It is necessary to make a more 
profound investigation of the underlying principles animating the whole of the 
Constitution … . hose principles must inform our overall appreciation of the 
constitutional rights and obligations … .22
Certainly, the assumption of a ‘grand structural plan’ is as problematic from 
an epistemological and argumentative viewpoint as are statements on the ‘spirit’ 
or ‘nature’ of a legal order. Nevertheless, the truth is that an idea of the whole 
is indispensable,23 and this article aims to convey such an idea via a synopsis 
17 Dann, op cit n 10 supra, 183 et seq.
18 Habermas, op cit n 16 supra, 211.
19 Gunnar Folke Schuppert and Christian Bumke, Die Konstitutionalisierung der Rechtsordnung, 
Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2000, 28 at 39; concerning ‘guiding visions’, see Uve Volkmann, ‘Ver-
fassungsrecht zwischen normativem Anspruch und politischer Wirklichkeit’, (2008) 67 Veröf-
fentlichungen der Vereinigung der Deutscher Staatsrechtslehrer, 57–128 at 67 et seq.
20 Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos [1963] ECR 1 at 13; Case 294/83, Les Verts v Parliament [1986] 
ECR 1339, para 25.
21 Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90, Francovich [1991] ECR I-5357, para 35.
22 Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 SCR 217 (Can), to question 1; akin Entscheidun-
gen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts 34, 269 at 287 (Soraya).
23 For more detail, see Friedrich Müller and Ralph Christensen, Juristische Methodik: Bd II Eu-
roparecht, Berlin, Duncker & Humblot, 2007, paras 349 et seq.
40
revija za evropsko ustavnost
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
(2010) 12
www.revus.eu
of founding principles. he respective role of legal scholarship can be labeled 
doctrinal constructivism.24 
Given the scepticism towards doctrine in the Anglo-Saxon world, this ap-
proach shall be briely sketched. Initially, ie in the late 19th and early 20th cen-
tury, the agenda of doctrinal constructivism aimed primarily at structuring the 
law using autonomous concepts, following the legal-conceptual (begrifsjuris-
tisch) stream of Friedrich Savigny’s historical school of law. he positive legal 
material is being transcended, not by way of political, historical, or philosophi-
cal relection, but through structure-giving concepts such as state, sovereignty, 
or individual rights in public law, which are conceived of as speciically legal and, 
thus, autonomous, which as a consequence fall under the exclusive competence 
of legal scholarship. he highest scientiic goal of the doctrinal construction is 
to reconstruct and represent both public and private law as complexes of sys-
tematically coordinated concepts. At the heart of these eforts lies the creation 
of an autonomous area of discourse and argumentation, a sort of middle level 
between natural law, which is primarily within the competence of philosophy 
and theology, and the concrete provisions of positive law, which are in the direct 
grasp of politics and the courts.25 In the course of the formation of substantive 
constitutional law and of the post-positivistic development of the original pro-
gramme, constitutional principles have increasingly assumed the role of these 
autonomous concepts.26 
For the programme of a holistic legal scholarship, ie a ‘system’ or an ‘over-
arching conception’, founding principles in European law are of particular im-
portance, since a legal-conceptual approach has hardly developed beyond an 
organising exegesis of the ECJ, not least due to the sometimes tumultuous de-
velopment of primary law. Nevertheless, the founding principles did not play 
this role from the beginning. At the beginning of the integration, the Treaties’ 
objectives were at the centre of eforts to develop an ‘overarching conception’.27 
In the course of the multiplication of these objectives this approach, however, 
24 For more detail, see Armin von Bogdandy, ‘Wissenschat vom Verfassungsrecht: Vergleich’, in 
ibid et al (eds), Handbuch Ius Publicum Europaeum, Heidelberg, C. F. Müller, 2008, vol II, § 
39.
25 Julius H. von Kirchmann, Die Wertlosigkeit der Jurisprudenz als Wissenschat, Freiburg, Hau-
fe, 1848, reprint 1990, 29, thus justiies the uselessness of jurisprudence as a science.
26 From the perspective of classic positivism, this is of course a story of decline, for a concise ac-
count, see Niklas Luhmann, Das Recht der Gesellschat, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1993, 
521 et seq. Further concretion is achieved through so-called ‘legal artefacts’, typical subjective 
rights or property, for instance; for more detail, see Ute Mager, Einrichtungsgarantien, Tü-
bingen, Mohr Siebeck, 2003, in particular 21 et seq and 98 et seq. hey are quite independent 
from positive law; however they can hardly be found in the law of the EU. his demonstrates 
the operational weakness of the doctrine of EU law.
27 Carl F. Ophüls, ‘Die Europäischen Gemeinschatsverträge als Planverfassungen’, in Joseph H. 
Kaiser (ed), Planung I (Nomos, 1965), 229 at 233; Ipsen, op cit n 13 supra, 128 et seq.
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lost its persuasiveness, which is conirmed by the abolition of the speciic goals 
of Articles 2 et seq EC by the Lisbon Treaty (Article 3 TEU-Lisbon). A princi-
ple-oriented approach seems a useful alternative.
he doctrinal constructivist endeavour appears to be particularly pressing 
with regard to European primary law. Its qualiication as ‘constitutional chaos’ is 
probably its best-known description.28 Of course the Treaty of Lisbon achieves a 
certain degree of systematisation, but it does not render futile academic eforts. 
Moreover, this principle-oriented scholarship does not only deal with primary 
law. he process of constitutionalisation requires that the constitution ‘permeate’ 
all legal relationships.29 A respective constitutional arrangement of the second-
ary law material demands a doctrinal constructivism for which, as the national 
examples show, constitutional principles and in particular single fundamental 
rights are indispensable. Numerous secondary law instruments downright call 
for this as they are to be interpreted in the light of founding principles, espe-
cially single fundamental rights, according to their recitals. Accordingly, the 
ECJ uses the conformity with primary law as a method of interpretation.30 he 
Charter of Fundamental Rights conirms this constitutionalisation, conveying a 
constitutional dimension to numerous interests. 
All this requires a sustainable concept of doctrinal constructivism. A doc-
trinal construct can only propose one and not the system of positive law. In the 
past, a system was oten crypto-idealistically believed to be inherent in the law 
and was sometimes dogmatically advanced as the single truth. his academic 
programme has been characterised as undemocratic or elitist;31 this criticism 
needs to be accommodated. In the light of this criticism, contemporary endeav-
ours should be directed towards the more humble goal of proposing means to 
arrange the legal material and develop the law. Hardly any legal scholar still 
maintains today that doctrinal constructs relect a pre-stabilised logical unity 
of the primary law or the one philosophy of integration of the Treaties. In par-
ticular, a constitutional doctrine must furthermore be aware of the danger of 
over-determining the political process. An awareness of the limits of the aca-
28 Deidre Curtin, ‘he Constitutional Structure of the Union’, (1993) 30 Common Market Law 
Review 17–69 at 67; the term was coined by Jürgen Habermas, Die neue Unübersichtlichkeit, 
Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1985.
29 For an early account, see G.F.W. Hegel, Rechtsphilosophie, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 
1821, ed Moldenhauer and Michel from 1970, § 274.
30 Case C-314/89, Rau [1991] ECR I-1647, para 17; Case C-98/91, Herbrink [1994] ECR I-223, 
para 9; Cases C-465/00, C-138/01 and C-139/01, ORF [2003] ECR I-4989, para 68; Case 
C-540/03, Parliament v Council [2006] ECR I-5769, paras 61 et seq, 104 et seq.
31 Seminal Hans Kelsen, Vom Wesen und Wert der Demokratie, Aalen, Scientia Verlag, 2nd re-
print of the 2nd edn of 1929, 1981), 23; ibid, Der soziologische und der juristische Staatsbegrif, 
Aalen, Scientia Verlag, 2nd reprint of the 2nd edn of 1928, 1981); Michelle Everson, ‘Is it just 
me, or is there an Elephant in the Room?’, (2007) 13 European Law Journal 136–145; Jo Murk-
ens, ‘he Future of Staatsrecht’, (2007) 70 he Modern Law Review 731–758.
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demic claim to truth is especially necessary for constructions based on princi-
ples, due to the openness of the stock of principles in general, to the semantic 
openness of single principles, to the openness of which principle prevails in 
cases of conlict.32 Similarly reduced are the expectations as to what a system 
can concretely accomplish in the operation of the law. A doctrine of principles 
as the result of doctrinal construction can moreover not be identical with legal 
practice. his is no insuiciency but rather proof of the critical content of a 
doctrinal construction. he project of a critical legal scholarship can also be 
pursued with doctrinal instruments. 
2.2.2 he Role of Legal Doctrine for Legal Practice 
In the above-quoted statement by the Supreme Court of Canada, principles 
not only generate insight through order but also supply arguments for a creative 
application of the law. his practical orientation is also a feature of doctrines of 
principles, legal scholarship being a primarily practical (social) science accord-
ing to the prevailing opinion. Principles have diverse functions in the applica-
tion of the law. 
Frequently, principles increase the number of arguments which can be em-
ployed to debate the legality of a certain act. In this respect, they can be de-
scribed as legal principles which transcend structural principles. By enlarging 
the argumentative budget of the legal profession, principles strengthen its au-
tonomy vis-à-vis the legislative political institutions. his happens mostly via a 
principle-oriented interpretation of a relevant norm, be it of primary or second-
ary law.33 By employing principles, the onus of demonstration is oten placed on 
the person arguing against the principle.34 Sometimes, however, the ECJ makes 
things too easy: by simply characterising a provision as a principle it sometimes 
attempts to justify its wide interpretation and the narrow interpretation of a 
contradictory norm.35 his is not convincing methodically, therefore, further 
32 Concerning discourses of application, see Klaus Günther, Der Sinn für Angemessenheit, 
Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1988, 300.
33 Concerning the principle-orientated interpretation of primary law, see Cases C-402/05 P and 
C-415/05 P, above n 8, para 303; further Case C-50/00 P, Union de Pequeños Agricultores v 
Council [2002] ECR I-6677, para 44; Case C-354/04, Gestoras Pro Amnistía et al v Council 
[2007] ECR I-1579, paras 51 et seq; Case C-355/04, Segi et al v Council [2007] ECR I-1657, 
paras 51 et seq; concerning the principle-orientated interpretation of secondary law, see Case 
C-540/03, Parliament v Council [2006] ECR I-5769, paras 70 et seq; Case C-305/05, Ordre des 
barreaux francophones et germanophone [2007] ECR I-5305, para 28.
34 For an instructive case, see Case C-361/01 P, Kik v HABM [2003] ECR I-8283, para 82, where 
the ECJ rejects a principle; on this, see Franz Mayer, ‘Europäisches Sprachenverfassungsrecht’, 
(2005) 44 Der Staat 367–401 at 394; this article at the same time demonstrates how legal prin-
ciples can be generated by legal scholarship.
35 Eg the principle of a common market: Case 7/61, Commission v Italy [1961] ECR 317 at 329; 
Case 113/80, Commission v Ireland [1981] ECR 1625, para 7.
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arguments are necessary.36 At times, a principle even becomes a legality stand-
ard of its own.37 A doctrine of principles must examine the relevant patterns of 
argumentation and develop general aspects and new understandings. he wide 
range of application of principles and their validity in diferent legal orders for 
instance allows for the generalisation of innovative local strategies to concretise 
principles. Yet at the same time, legal scholarship should highlight the costs of 
such an autonomisation, for example in light of the principle of democracy.
Finally, it should be noted that there is one function that a legal doctrine of 
principles cannot usually fulil: to delimit right and wrong in a concrete case. 
his is a result of the general vagueness of principles; the conlict usually arising 
when diferent principles are applied to concrete facts is another reason. he 
solution to a conlict of principles cannot be determined either scientiically or 
legally, it can only be structured.
2.3.2 Maintenance and Development of a ‘Legal Infrastructure’
he constructive and the practical element converge in a function of doc-
trinal constructivism which can be labeled as ‘maintenance of the law as social 
infrastructure’. First of all, this refers to the creation and safeguarding of legal 
transparency,38 which is of particular importance in the EU’s fragmented legal 
order. Furthermore, the ‘infrastructure maintenance’ function of legal scholar-
ship is not static but demands participation in the development of the law to 
keep it in line with changing social relationships, interests and beliefs. In this re-
spect, principles can fulil the function of ‘gateways’ through which the legal or-
der is attached to the broader public discourse. his attachment is of particular 
importance for the EU’s primary law, given the ponderousness of the procedure 
of Article 48 EU. For this reason too, doctrinal work should not be restricted to 
the analysis of the positive law but also aim at its propositive development.
Constitutional principles enable an internal critique of the positive law, the 
pronouncement of which is a core function of constitutional law scholarship 
and which aims at the development of the positive law, be it via the jurispruden-
tial or the political process. hey promote the transparency of legal argumenta-
tion, are gateways for new convictions and interests, can be agents of universal 
reason against local rationalities. his criticism difers from general political 
criticism since it is phrased in legal terms, is closely connected to the previous 
operation of the law and can thus be absorbed by the law more easily. Title I 
36 Karl Larenz and Claus-Wilhelm Canaris, Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschat, Berlin, 
Springer, 1995, 175 et seq; convincing Appellate Body, WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, EC 
Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), para 104.
37 For more detail, see Tridimas, op cit n 2 supra, 29 et seq.
38 Schuppert and Bumke, op cit n 19 supra, 40.
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of the EU Treaty in its previous as well as in the Lisbon version calls for such a 
critique due to its manifesto character. 
2.3 Perspectives of Legal and Integration Policy
Principles enable an autonomous legal discourse, strengthen the autonomy 
of courts vis-à-vis politics and allow for an internal development of the law 
which circumvents Article 48 EU. Is this acceptable in light of the principle 
of democracy? he answer to this question has to distinguish between juris-
prudence and legal scholarship. For the latter, it needs to be kept in mind that 
doctrinal constructions are no source of law but are only of propositive nature. 
Moreover, legal scholarship can invoke academic freedom,39 and thus far Max 
Weber’s insight that only a conceptualised and thus rationalised legal order can 
adequately structure social and political processes in complex societies has not 
been refuted. From this follows a functional legitimisation of this academic ap-
proach.40 Nevertheless, legal scholarship should not be blind to the possible 
consequences of its constructions. Particular attention needs to be paid to the 
problematique of the development of the law through judicial practice, courts 
being the most important addressees of doctrinal constructivism. 
Regarding the use of principles by courts, it needs to be noted that all con-
temporary law is positive law. Positivity implies the domain of politically respon-
sible bodies:41 the law is made by the legislator or is—in common law systems 
or other cases of judicial development of the law—under his responsibility; the 
legislature can correct a legal situation resulting from judicial development of 
the law.42 he judicial development of a body of law which can only be modi-
ied by the legislator under qualiied requirements is thus critical and a standard 
topic of constitutional scholarship.43 However, it is generally recognised that 
some judicial development of the law lows from and is justiied by the assign-
ment given to courts to adjudicate; it is mostly its limits which are being de-
39 Compared to the German Basic Law (Grundgesetz), its protection on the European level is not 
as far-reaching, see Jean-Christophe Galloux, in Laurence Burgorgue-Larsen et al (eds), Traité 
établissant une Constitution pour l’Europe, Brussels, Bruylant, 2005, vol II, Art II-73, para 12.
40 Max Weber, Wirtschat und Gesellschat, Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, 1972, 825 et seq.
41 Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, ‘Demokratie als Verfassungsprinzip’, in ibid (ed), Staat, Verfas-
sung, Demokratie, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1991, 289 at 322.
42 Concerning common law, see Patrick S. Atiyah and Robert S. Summers, Form and Substance 
in Anglo-American Law, Oxford, Clarendon, 1991, 141 et seq.
43 Alexander M. Bickel, he Least Dangerous Branch, Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill, 1962; for 
a study of comparative law see Ulrich Haltern, Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit, Demokratie und 
Misstrauen, Berlin, Duncker & Humblot, 1998; on the ECJ from an internal perspective, see 
Klaus-Dieter Borchardt, ‘Richterrecht durch den Gerichtshof der Europäischen Gemein-
schaten’, in Albrecht Randelzhofer et al (eds), Gedächtnisschrit für Professor Dr. Eberhard 
Grabitz, München, Beck, 1995, 29.
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bated.44 Accordingly, the ECJ outlines its competence to develop the law with 
respect to the Treaty amendment procedure.45 
Another argument for the legal conceptualisation of political and social con-
licts as conlicts of principles is that this may lead to their channelling and 
perhaps even rationalisation. Moreover, principles can play a supporting role 
for democratic discourses.46 In addition, a judicial decision which employs the 
balancing of principles is more intelligible for most citizens than a ‘legal-tech-
nical’ reasoning phrased in hermetic language which obscures the valuations 
of the court. To devise legal controversies as conlicts of principles allows for a 
politicisation which should be welcomed in light of the principle of democracy, 
since it promotes the public discourse on judicial decisions. 
Principles such as primacy and direct efect form the key to the constitu-
tionalisation of the Community law.47 If the discussion on founding and con-
stitutional principles is nevertheless a rather recent phenomenon, this is to be 
explained by the history of integration. he path to integration has not been 
constitutional, but rather functional. he objectives were determined by the 
Treaties with suicient clarity, allowing the European discourse to unfold in 
a pragmatic and administrative manner, unburdened by politic-ethical argu-
ments.48 his orientation decisively inluenced the jurisprudential construc-
tion. he federal conception failed to gain a larger following in legal scholar-
ship; economic law approaches and administrative law approaches were—at 
least in Germany—much more successful. he ECJ only slowly developed prin-
ciples limiting the power of the Community.49 As late as 1986, Pierre Pescatore 
ascertained that although the principles of proportionality, good administra-
tion, legal certainty, the protection of fundamental rights or defence rights ex-
isted, they amounted to ‘peu de chose’, ‘où on peut mettre tout et son contraire’.50 
his was to change profoundly. Due to the single market programme and the 
Maastricht Treaty, the debate about European founding and constitutional 
44 On judicial development of the law by the ECJ, see Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungs-
gerichts 75, 223 at 243.
45 However only in those cases where the denial of a proposed judicial development of the law 
seemed to suit the court well, Opinion 2/94, EMRK [1996] ECR I-1759, para 30 and Case 
C-50/00 P, op cit n 33 supra, para 44; Case C-263/02 P, Commission v Jégo-Quéré [2004] ECR 
I-3425, para 36.
46 Larry Siedentop, Democracy in Europe, London, Allen Lane, 2000, 100.
47 Seminal Eric Stein, ‘Lawyers, Judges and the Making of a Transnational Constitution’, (1981) 
75 American Jorunal of International Law 1–27.
48 On the diferent formations of discourses see Habermas, op cit n 16 supra, 159 et seq.
49 Pierre Pescatore, Le droit de l’intégration, Leiden, Sijthof, 1972, 70 et seq; Helmut Lecheler, 
Der Europäische Gerichtshof und die allgemeinen Rechtsgrundsätze, Berlin, Duncker & Hum-
blot, 1971.
50 Pierre Pescatore, ‘Les principes généraux du droit en tant que source du droit communautaire’, 
in ibid (ed), Études de droit communautaire européen 1962–2007, Brussels, Bruylant, 2008, 691.
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principles unfolded quickly.51 It resulted in Article 6 of the Amsterdam Treaty 
of 1997 (Article 2 TEU-Lisbon) which forms the most important positive basis 
of European founding principles. 
Lastly, the role of a doctrine of principles in promoting a common under-
standing of the EU among its citizens and the formation of a European back-
ground consensus on the operation of the European institutions shall be out-
lined. Certainly, a doctrine of principles developed by legal scholarship cannot 
directly trigger the creation of an identity for broad parts of the population.52 
Yet it can be understood as a part of a public discourse through which the 
European citizenry ascertains the foundations of its polity. 
In this discourse on the politics of integration, principles can assume an 
ideological function. A depiction of the EU in the light of principles certainly 
has such a potential.53 he Treaty of Lisbon is problematic in this respect as it 
presents the founding principles of the EU as ‘values’ and thus as an expression 
of the ethical convictions of EU citizens (Article 2 TEU-Lisbon). A legal doc-
trine of principles should be based on a better foundation than sociological as-
sumptions regarding normative dispositions of EU citizens and should indicate 
the diference between law and ethics in light of the freedom principle.54 Value 
discourses can easily acquire a paternalistic dimension.
3 CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES AND FOUNDING 
PRINCIPLES
3.1 Principles in European Law
he authors of the Treaties55 like the term ‘principle’: it is employed remark-
ably frequently in most language versions. he English and the French versions 
51 Jochen A. Frowein, ‘Die Herausbildung europäischer Verfassungsprinzipien’, in Arthur Kauf-
mann et al (eds), Rechtsstaat und Menschenwürde, Frankfurt am Main, Klostermann, 1988, 
149–158; Jörg Gerkrath, L’emergence d’un droit constitutional pour l’Europe, Brussels, Editions 
de l'Universite de Bruxelles, 1997, 183 et seq; Joseph H.H. Weiler, ‘European Neo-Constitutio-
nalism’, (1996) 44 Political Studies 517–533.
52 Franis G. Snyder, ‘Editorial: Dimensions and Precipitates of EU Constitutional Law’, (2002) 8 
European Law Journal 315–318.
53 Koen Lenaerts, ‘In the Union We Trust’, (2004) 41 Common Market Law Review 317–343.
54 Erhard Denninger, ‘Freiheitsordnung – Wertordnung – Plichtordnung’, in ibid (ed), Der ge-
bändigte Leviathan, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1990, 143–157 at 149. Illuminating the compari-
son with the US debate concerning rights theory versus moral conventionalism, see Paul Brest, 
‘he Fundamental Rights Controversy’, (1981) 90 Yale Law Journal 1063–1109.
55 he term ‘authors of the Treaties’ characterises the Member States as a collective under Art 48 
EU. On the term ‘founding authority of the Community’, see Case T-28/03, Holcim v Commis-
sion [2005] ECR II-1357, para 34; Case T-172/98, Salamander et al v Parliament and Council 
[2000] ECR II-2487, para 75.
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of the previous version of the EU Treaty use it 22 times, those of the EC Treaty 
48 times, according to the Treaty of Lisbon even 98 times altogether, and the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights employs ‘principle’ 14 times in its English and 
French versions. he context in which this term is used ranges from the princi-
ple of democracy (Article 6 EU-Nice) to the principles of national social secu-
rity systems (Article 153 (4) TFEU); some principles are even to be laid down 
by the Council (Article 291 TFEU). In the German version, the word ‘principle’ 
appears far less frequently, only three times in the previous version of the EU 
Treaty and four times in the EC Treaty, mostly in connection with the subsidi-
arity principle. his atrophy of principles in the German version is due to the 
fact that instead of the English ‘principle’ or the French ‘principe’, the German 
word ‘Grundsatz’ is used; this also holds true for the German version of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
he use of the word ‘principle’ in the Treaty text has attributive character. 
he Treaty maker thus assigns enhanced signiicance to the relevant element or 
even to whole provisions and provides orientation to the reader in a text which 
is diicult to penetrate. At the same time, a principle usually lays down general 
requirements, eg in Article 6(1) EU-Nice or Article 71(2) EC. he notion char-
acterised as principle shall make statements on a whole, insofar as having a re-
lexive connotation. Furthermore, the Treaty maker oten identiies as principles 
elements of a provision with a rather vague content, as even the principles for 
single topics such as those of Article 191(2) TFEU or Article 317 TFEU show. 
In his inluential theory, Alexy distinguishes between principles and rules 
and characterises the former as being optimisation commands which are sub-
ject to balancing.56 his may be the reason why the Legal Service of the Council 
identiies the primacy of Community law in the German version as a ‘funda-
mental pillar’ in order to render it immune to balancing, whereas the English 
version uses the term ‘cornerstone principle’.57 However, the categorical difer-
entiation between rules and principles underlying this theory is not altogether 
convincing and will not be used in this article to characterise principles.58 
he qualiication as principle as such does not trigger speciic legal conse-
quences. his can be demonstrated especially clearly by comparing Articles 
23 and 52(5) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. he equality impera-
tive of Article 23 of the Charter is an enforceable principle of Community 
56 For more detail, see Robert Alexy, heorie der Grundrechte, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 
2006, 75 et seq.
57 European Council, Opinion of the Legal Service, Council Doc 11197/07, see further F. Mayer, 
‘Die Rückkehr der Europäischen Verfassung?’, (2007) 67 Zeitschrit für ausländisches öfetn-
liches Recht und Völkerrecht 1141–1217 at 1153; concerning primacy as a principle, see Mat-
thias Niedobitek, ‘Der Vorrang des Unionsrechts’, in ibid et al (eds), Continuing the European 
Constitutional Debate, Berlin, Duncker & Humblot, 2008, 63–104 at 65 et seq.
58 András Jakab, ‘Prinzipien’, [2006] Rechtstheorie 49–65.
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law.59 Article 52(5) of the Charter, on the other hand, explicitly distinguish-
es between enforceable rights and principles. he presumption of a missing 
overarching conception of the authors of the Treaty is conirmed by the rather 
fortuitous assignment of attributes such as guiding (Article 119(3) TFEU), 
existing (Article 47(2) EC), basic (Article 67(5) EC), uniform (Article 207(1) 
TFEU), fundamental (Article 340(2) TFEU), general (Article 340(2) TFEU) 
or essential (Article 2 of the Protocol on the Financial Consequences of the 
Expiry of the Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community 
and on the Research Fund for Coal and Steel). One has to analyse individu-
ally for every single use of the word ‘principle’ what legal consequences are 
attached to the norm, especially with regard to legal remedies and judicial 
review.60
he word ‘principle’ not only denotes a term of positive EU law but also 
of jurisprudential analysis. As explained in section 2.2, it is indispensable for 
the fulilment of the tasks of legal scholarship. Nevertheless it is debated what 
exactly a ‘principle’ is; behind the term stand competing concepts of law.61 his 
is rightly so since the deinition of a jurisprudential term is not about truth but 
about expediency in view of the scientiic objective. his brings us to the found-
ing principles.
3.2 he EU’s Founding Principles  
and their Constitutional Character
his article uses founding principle as a term of legal scholarship in order 
to identify and interpret, in the tradition of constitutionalism, those norms of 
primary law having a normative founding function for the whole of the EU’s 
legal order; they determine the relevant legitimatory foundations in view of 
the need to justify the exercise of public authority.62 In this respect, this under-
standing links up with the above-mentioned concept of principles in primary 
law: principles are special legal norms relating to the whole of a legal order. 
Founding principles as a sub-category express an overarching normative frame 
of reference for all primary law, indeed for the whole of the EU’s legal order. 
his substantive conception of founding principles does not capture all norms 
59 Settled case-law; cf Cases 117/76 and 16/77, Ruckdeschel [1977] ECR 1753, para 7.
60 For more detail, see Chris Hilson, ‘Rights and Principles in EU Law’, (2008) 15 Maastricht 
journal of European and comparative law 193–215 at 215.
61 Seminal Dworkin, op cit n 16 supra, 24 et seq; Alexy, op cit n 56 supra, 72 et seq; on the debate, 
see Riccardo Guastini, Distinguendo: Studi di teoria e metateoria del diritto, Torino, Giap-
pichelli, 1996, 115 et seq; Maria Luisa Fernandez Esteban, he Rule of Law in the European 
Constitution, Hague, Kluwer Law International, 1999, 39 et seq; Martti Koskenniemi, ‘General 
Principles’, in ibid (ed), Sources of International Law, Aldershot, Darthmouth, 2000, 359.
62 On the term ‘principe fondateur’, see Molinier, op cit n 2 supra, 24; for a similar view, see 
Dworkin, op cit n 16 supra, 22.
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or elements of norms labelled principle in the Treaties or by the ECJ, but only a 
few provisions which are also called founding principles or structuring principles 
in national constitutions.63 
It is useful to understand the founding principles as constitutional princi-
ples and to deal with them accordingly.64 he EU became a political Union in 
the 1990s. Ater long debates, in 1997 the authors of the Treaty founded the 
EU on ‘the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fun-
damental freedoms, and the rule of law’ and thus on the core programme of 
liberal-democratic constitutionalism. his implies a decision for constitutional 
semantics which is now to be elaborated by constitutional doctrine.65 he nor-
mative content of the indicative mode ‘is founded’ in Article 6(1) EU and cor-
responds to that of the indicative mode ‘is’ in Article 20(1) of the German Basic 
Law (Grundgesetz).66
A comparison with Article F of the EU Treaty in its Maastricht version 
illustrates the signiicance of the political decision of 1997. Article F is still 
formulated entirely from a limiting perspective underlying Article 6(3) EU 
right until today: Article 6(3) EU commits the EU to general principles of 
law which have no constitutive but only a restrictive function.67 In 1997 the 
Treaty maker then laid down the normative core contents on which the EU is 
founded in Article 6(1) EU. In this respect, the constitutional content of the 
former Article 6(1) EU exceeds by far the constitutional dimension of the 
Maastricht Treaty. Now not only a restrictive, but also a constitutive European 
constitutionalism has found its recognition in positive law. he legal approach 
pursued here with its substantive notion of what a founding principle is spells 
out the political decision voiced in the Amsterdam Treaty that a European 
political Union is to be founded on the postulates of liberal-democratic con-
stitutionalism. 
Founding principles are thus the principles laid down in Article 6(1) EU-Nice 
(now Art. 2 TEU) as well as the other principles located in Title I EU regarding 
the allocation of competences, loyal cooperation and structural compatibility. 
63 For more detail, see Horst Dreier, in ibid (ed), Grundgesetz-Kommentar, Tübingen, Mohr 
Siebeck, 2006, vol II, Art 20 (Einführung), paras 5, 8; Franz Reimer, Verfassungsprinzipien, 
Berlin, Duncker & Humblot, 2001, 26 et seq.
64 he ECJ too speaks of constitutional principles of the EC Treaty: Cases C-402/05 P and 
C-415/05 P, op cit n 8 supra, para 285. Cf on this the relections in the introduction.
65 Beutler, in von der Groeben and Schwarze (eds), op cit n 2 supra, para 1; Pedro Cruz Villalón, 
La constitución inédita, Madrid, Editorial Trotta, 2004, 73, 143; Hans-Werner Rengeling and 
Peter Szczekalla, Grundrechte in der Europäischen Union, Köln, Heymanns, 2004, paras 92 et 
seq.
66 Art 6(1) EU is slowly becoming operative; on the principle-orientated interpretation of pri-
mary law, see Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, op cit n 8 supra, para 303.
67 Molinier, op cit n 2 supra, 29; cf the principles discussed by Tridimas and Groussot, op cit n 2 
supra.
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his approach is conirmed by Title I TEU-Lisbon with regard to the founding 
principles of the federal relationship between the EU and its Member States. 
Other principles of primary law do not belong to these overarching founding 
principles but serve to concretise them and thus derive constitutional content 
from them.
he tenets laid down in Article 2 TEU-Lisbon, although denoted as ‘val-
ues’, are to be understood as legal norms and principles, as founding principles. 
Usually, principles are distinguished from values, the latter being fundamental 
ethical convictions whereas the former are legal norms. Since the ‘values’ of 
Article 2 TEU-Lisbon have been agreed upon in the procedure of Article 48 EU 
and produce legal consequences (eg Articles 3(1), 7, 49 TEU-Lisbon), they are 
legal norms, and since they are overarching and constitutive, they are found-
ing principles.68 he use of the term ‘value’ in Article 2 TEU-Lisbon instead of 
‘principle’, the obscure normative function of the second sentence of this arti-
cle as well as the diferences between the diverse formulations of the posited 
values69 illustrate the remaining uncertainties concerning the identiication of 
European founding principles. 
Due to its analytical nature, the qualiication of a norm as founding principle 
does not mean that other understandings would be excluded. here are for-
midable analyses of the same principles eg as administrative principles.70 he 
constitutional and the administrative approach overlap with regard to supra-
national public law. One may ask why this study legally qualiies the found-
ing principles as constitutional principles, but does not designate them as such. 
First, this is in line with the judicature: until recently, the ECJ has used the term 
‘constitutional principle’ only for constitutional norms of the Member States.71 
In the Kadi decision, the term ‘constitutional principle’ igures prominently also 
with regard to Community law,72 underlining the innovative force of this judg-
ment. More common so far, however, is the denomination as founding princi-
ple.73 But most of all, to employ the wide term of ‘constitutional principle’ for 
the principles presented here as founding principles would challenge the con-
68 On the diiculty related to the concept of ‘values’ see section II C.
69 Compare the third recital of the preamble to the EU Treaty and Art 6(1) EU with Art 2 
TEU-Lis and the second recital to the preamble to the EU Charter for Fundamental Rights.
70 Giacinto della Cananea, ‘Il diritto amministrativo europeo e i suoi principi fondamentali’, in 
ibid (ed), Diritto amministrativo europeo, Milano, Giufrè, 2006, 1 at 17 et seq.
71 Case C-36/02, Omega [2004] ECR I-9609, para 12; Case C-49/07, MOTOE [2008] ECR I-0000, 
para 12. Occasionally, an Advocate General uses this term for the law of the EU, AG Kokott in 
Cases C-387/02, 391/02 and 403/02, Berlusconi [2005] ECR I-3565, no 163.
72 Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, op cit n 8 supra, para 285.
73 Cases C-46/93 and C-48/93, Brasserie du pêcheur [1996] ECR I-1029, para 27; Case C-255/02, 
Hailfax [2006] ECR I-1609, para 92; Case C-438/05, International Transport Workers’ Fed-
eration [2007] ECR I-10779, para 68; Case C-162/07, Ampliscientiica [2008] ECR I-0000, 
para 25.
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stitutional character of other principles of primary law, something which is not 
the aim of this article. 
In EU law, it has to be distinguished between principles, in particular 
founding principles, and objectives. he EU ‘is founded’ on principles (Article 
6(1) EU-Nice, Article 2 TEU-Lisbon), and principles limit the actions of the 
Member States and the EU. Objectives, on the other hand, stipulate the in-
tended efects in social reality. he conjunction of objectives and principles as 
for example in Article 3(1) TEU-Lisbon does not undermine this distinction. 
he separation of objectives of integration and constitutional principles is 
also suggested by the shortcomings of the functionalist approach to European 
integration.74
3.3 Principles of Public International Law
International public law scholarship operates with the term ‘constitutional 
principle’, too,75 and the question arises whether general principles of public in-
ternational law or principles of individual Treaties, in particular the UN Charter, 
the Human Rights Covenants or the WTO Agreement, must be included in an 
analysis of the EU’s founding principles. Article 3(5) TEU-Lisbon can be under-
stood in this sense. Furthermore international Treaties stand above the derived 
law according to Article 216(2) TFEU; this also applies to general principles of 
international law.76 
However, a closer analysis of the jurisprudence shows that norms of inter-
national law, with the exception of the provisions of the European Convention 
on Human Rights,77 do not play a decisive role for the exercise of public au-
thority by the EU; consequently, they will not be addressed in this article. 
his basic decision is already expressed in the Costa/ENEL judgment: while 
the Van Gend judgment characterised the Community law as ‘a new legal or-
der of international law’, ever since Costa the ECJ only speaks of a ‘new legal 
order’ tout court.78 he prevailing understanding of European constitutional-
ism does not conceive of it as a sub-category of an overarching international 
constitutionalism.79
74 See section II C.
75 Kadelbach and Kleinlein, op cit n 11 supra.
76 Case C-162/96, Racke [1998] ECR I-3655, paras 45–51.
77 Note the refusal of direct efect concerning the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea in Case 
C-308/06, Intertanko [2008] ECR I-0000, paras 42 et seq.
78 See Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, op cit n 8 supra, para 316.
79 Jean d’Aspremont and Frédéric Dopagne, ‘Two Constitutionalisms in Europe’, (2008) 68 Zeit-
schrit für ausländisches öfentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 903–937.
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4 UNIFORM FOUNDING PRINCIPLES  
IN VIEW OF HETEROGENEOUS PRIMARY LAW
4.1 Establishing Unity of Principle
he principles set forth in Title I EU are valid for the whole of EU law, i.e. 
the EU Treaty and the TFEU. Although this is unquestionable under Article 2 
TEU-Lisbon, it was doubted under previous Treaties in particular with refer-
ence to the so-called ‘pillar structure’ of the Treaties (EC-Treaty, Title V and 
Title VI EU). In fact, Titles V and VI of the EU Treaty-Nice did not correspond 
in every respect to the so-called community method including supranationality, 
direct efect and comprehensive European judicial review. he special rules were 
an expression of important compromises in the context of the Treaty-making 
process which need to be taken seriously by legal scholarship. According to 
some scholars, however, the EU did not even exercise public authority. hey 
maintained that ‘in reality’, the Member States and not the EU’s organs operated 
under Title V and VI EU. Accordingly, a categorical diferentiation would have 
to be made between Community law and the law of the EU. Acts of the Council 
under Title V and VI EU, for instance a framework decision, would not be acts 
of the EU, but an international agreement between the Member States.80 An 
overarching doctrine of principles would thus be rather nugatory.81
here were, however, good reasons for conceiving the EU as one body of pub-
lic authority and the law of the EU Treaty and that of the Community Treaties 
as a single legal order, delimiting it from the legal orders of the Member States 
on the one hand and from international law on the other hand. First of all, the 
organisational fusion shall be outlined. Since 1994, it was always the Council of 
the European Union which was named as the legislative organ in the legal acts 
under Title V and VI EU, never the Member States. Moreover, this unity was 
explicitly mandated for the founding principle of fundamental rights protection 
(Article 46(d) EU-Nice)82 and could furthermore be based on provisions such 
as Article 1 or Articles 48 et seq EU-Nice.83 Seen in this light, it is only consist-
80 Andreas Haratsch, Christian König and Matthias Pechstein, Europarecht, Tübingen, Mohr 
Siebeck, 2006, paras 79, 83; in the same vein, see also Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungs-
gerichts 113, 273 at 301.
81 Matthias Pechtsein, in Rudolf Streinz (ed), EUV/EGV, München, Beck, 2003, Art 6 EU, para 2 
et seq.
82 Concerning the uniformity of standards, see Case C-303/05, Advocaten voor de Wereld (Euro-
pean Arrest Warrant) [2007] ECR I-3633, para 45.
83 For more detail, see Armin von Bogdandy, ‘he Legal Case for Unity’, (1999) 36 Common 
Market Law Review  887–910; along similar lines, see Hermann-Josef Blanke, in Calliess and 
Rufert (eds), op cit n 2 supra, Art 3 EU, paras 1, 3; Christoph Stumpf, in Jürgen Schwarze (ed), 
EU-Kommentar, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2008, Art 3 EU, para 1.
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ent that the ECJ expanded the scope of Community law principles to cover legal 
acts under Titles V and VI EU.84
he assumption of legal unity of EU law could also be justiied through the 
principle of coherence which itself is based on the principle of equality. It consti-
tutes the vanishing point for academic system-building—and thus unity-build-
ing—and enables a critique inherent to the law of diverging logics of regulation 
and lines of jurisprudence. It inds its positive foundations in the equality prin-
ciple (Article 20 of the Charter) and provisions such as Articles 3(1) EU-Nice 
(13(1) TEU-Lisbon), 225(2) and (3) EC (256(2) and (3) TFEU.
4.2. Limits of a Unitarian Approach
Coherence is no principle with general primacy; there may be good rea-
sons for divergence.85 Assuming the legal unity of the EU’s legal order does not 
amount to maintaining that the positive constitutional law or even the jurispru-
dence relating to it form a harmonious whole. he assumption of a legal order of 
the EU which included Community law as its main part thus does not deny the 
fact that a number of legal instruments of Community law could not be applied 
at all or only with restrictions under Titles V and VI EU. he general assertion 
is that Community law principles could be applied if this was compatible with 
the speciic rules of the EU Treaty. Although the Treaty of Lisbon ofers con-
siderable progress regarding systematisation and reduces this fragmentation,86 
it does not overcome it, as the Protocol on the application of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights to Poland and to the United Kingdom illustrates.87
Even under the premise of a uniform validity of the founding principles, the 
question arises whether this corresponds to a uniform meaning in the various 
areas of EU law. For instance, the dual structure for democratic legitimation 
through the Council and Parliament only exists under the competences of the 
84 For more detail, see Koen Lenaerts and Tim Corthaut, ‘Towards an Internally Consistent 
Doctrine on Invoking Norms of EU Law’, in Sacha Prechal and Bert van Roermund (eds), he 
Coherence of EU Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008, 495–531; homas Giegerich, 
‘Verschmelzung der drei Säulen der EU durch europäisches Richterrecht’, (2007) 67 Zeitschrit 
für ausländisches öfentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 351–383. However, the ECJ occasionally 
describes EU and EC law as ‘integrated but separate legal orders’, see Cases C-402/05 P and 
C-415/05 P, op cit n 8 supra, para 202.
85 For more detail, see Filomena Chirico and Pierre Larouche, ‘Conceptual Divergence, Func-
tionalism, and the Economics of Convergence’, in Prechal and van Roermund (eds), ibid, 
463–495.
86 Rudolf Streinz et al, Der Vertrag von Lissabon zur Reform der EU, München, Beck, 2008, 33 et 
seq.
87 For suggestions on how to deal with this situation, see Dougan, op cit n 7 supra, 665 et seq; it 
is not that exceptional, see Alexander Hanebeck, ‘Die Einheit der Rechtsordnung als Anfor-
derung an den Gesetzgeber’, (2002) 41 Der Staat 429–451.
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TFEU, and judicial review by the ECJ, paramount for the rule of law principle, 
is limited or even precluded in important domains.
his gives rise to doubts about the usefulness of an overarching doctrine of 
principles. It might even nurture the suspicion that a doctrine of principles is 
not the product of scholarly insight, but rather a policy instrument for more 
integration and federalism. Yet these doubts and suspicions are unfounded. As 
the principles set forth in Article 6 EU-Nice (Article 2 TEU-Lisbon) applied 
to all areas of EU law, an overarching doctrine of principles built thereupon 
encompassing the entire primary law was a logical consequence. Article 6 EU 
essentially required its own expansion into a general doctrine of principles.88 
Article 6(1) EU declared that the EU is ‘founded’ on these principles; this con-
tains an ambitious normative programme. he EU Treaty can therefore even be 
interpreted as a constitution stipulating criteria for the detection of deicits and 
guidelines to overcome them.89
An overarching doctrine of principles is thus possible. his basic objection 
being defeated, it might nevertheless appear problematic, in view of the fragmen-
tation within primary law, to determine which provisions may be understood as 
concretising abstract principles. heoretically, both the co-decision procedure 
under Article 294 EC as well as the Council’s autonomous decision-making 
competence under the requirement of unanimity can be understood as realisa-
tions of the principle of democracy. his article, however, maintains that the 
supranational standard case, also called the Community method,90 can justii-
ably be used for the development of a doctrine of EU principles. he Treaty 
of Lisbon conirms this thesis with the introduction of an ‘ordinary legislative 
procedure’ in Article 289 TFEU.91 In general it is to be expected that under the 
Treaty of Lisbon, the founding principles of Article 2 TEU-Lisbon will be con-
cretised in light of the enunciations of the EU Treaty, and that diverging rules 
in the TFEU will be treated as exceptions. In particular, in its Lisbon version, 
the EU Treaty contains elements of a manifesto-constitution which is executed 
by the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union only inchoately. he 
88 A similar concern can be found in Art 23(1) of the German Basic Law which secures the 
structural integrity.
89 Armin von Bogdandy, ‘he Prospect of a European Republic’, (2005) 42 Common Market Law 
Review  913–941 at 934 et seq.
90 hus labelled in the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe; on this, see Christian Cal-
liess, in ibid and Matthias Rufert (eds), Verfassung der Europäischen Union, München, Beck, 
2006, Art I-1 VVE, paras 47 et seq; on the community method, see Jürgen Bast, ‘Einheit und 
Diferenzierung der Europäischen Verfassung’, in Becker et al (eds), op cit n 10 supra, 34–60 
at 52 et seq.
91 In the same vein, see Case C-133/06, Parliament v Council [2008] ECR I-0000, para 63; con-
cerning the new diferentiation between parliamentary (co-) legislation and bare law-making; 
pathbreaking Koen Lenaerts, see for instance Sénat et Chambre des représentants de Belgique 
(eds), Les inalités de l’Union européenne, Brussels, Conseil, 2001, 14 at 15.
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legal treatment of the resulting tensions should be guided by principles, even 
more so as speciic rules are hardly available. he further constitutionalisation 
of Europe demands the normative illumination of the new EU Treaty, especially 
of its Titles I and II, and the development of hermeneutic and legal-political 
strategies for its implementation.
An understanding in the tradition of European constitutionalism as advo-
cated here will strive to expand the idea underlying the EU Treaty in its Lisbon 
version of a representative constitution with separation of powers and funda-
mental rights protection to all areas and protocols. It will however not strive to 
expand the competences of the EU at the expense of the Member States or to 
override speciic rules. An overarching doctrine of principles must not down-
play sectoral rules which follow diferent rationales. To do otherwise would in-
fringe upon an important founding principle: Article 4(2) EU in conjunction 
with Article 48 EU clearly shows that the essential constitutional dynamics are 
to remain under the control of the respective national parliaments.92 An argu-
mentation based on principles uncoupled from the concrete provisions of the 
Treaties would misunderstand essential elements of the EU’s constitutional law: 
he EU Constitution is a constitution of details; this corresponds to the hetero-
geneity of its political and social basis.93 he plethora of details expresses this 
diversity, but also the Member States’ mistrust and desire for control. 
5 OUTLOOK
his article has attempted to show that the principles of Article 2 EU (previ-
ous Article 6(1) EU-Nice) can be understood as constitutional principles and 
that a constitutional legal discourse based thereon is viable both from a theo-
retical and a technical legal point of view. It further conirms understanding 
and approaching ethical, political or economic conlicts as conlicts of princi-
ples, as this can serve to further one’s insight and help to solve such conlicts.94 
92 Opinion 2/94, op cit n 45 supra, paras 10 et seq; Case C-376/98, Germany v Parliament and 
Council [2000] ECR I-8419.
93 Jean-Clause Piris, he Constitution for Europe, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006, 
59. his certainly does not exclude streamlining and abstractions at many points, see Bruno 
De Witte, ‘Too Much Constitutional Law in the European Union’s Foreign Relations?’, in M. 
Cremona and ibid (eds), EU Foreign Relations Law, Oxford, Hart, 2008, 3–15 at 7.
94 In the tradition of critical legal studies, such an approach is suspected of being Ideology, on 
this, see Günther Frankenberg, ‘Der Ernst im Recht’, [1978] Kritische Justiz 281–307; ibid, 
‘Partisanen der Rechtskritik’, in Sonja Buckel et al (eds), Neue heorien des Rechts, Stuttgart, 
Lucius & Lucius, 2006, 97–116; Duncan Kennedy, Critique of Adjudication, London, Harvard 
University Press, 2003; ibid, ‘he Structure of Blackstone’s Commentaries’, (1979) 28 Bufalo 
Law Review 209–382; Roberto M. Unger, ‘he Critical Legal Studies Movement’, (1983) 96 
Harvard Law Review 561–675. 
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However, it must be noted that legal principles cannot provide scientiic solu-
tions for such conlicts. his, however, does not rule out principle-based propos-
als for solutions by scholars who, owing to their systematic appreciation and 
their being unencumbered by the pressures of practice, have a speciic role in 
the respective legal discourses. 
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